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Abstract 
Anxiety is an emotional state that has been associated with negative outcomes on cognitive tasks, 
as well as low confidence in responses, specifically in the domain of long-term memory. The 
following series of experiments explored the effect of anxiety on long-term memory performance 
as well as on memory confidence, the accuracy-confidence relation, and response times. The 
purpose was to determine how realistic anxious participants are when making confidence 
judgments compared to low anxious peers and to attempt to improve the memory accuracy and 
confidence of highly anxious individuals. In Experiment 1, participants encoded words presented 
visually, followed by an anxiety induction. Those with higher anxiety scores had poorer memory 
accuracy for target words as well as less confidence in their memory overall, consistent with 
much of the literature. Response time (RTs) was slower in the high- relative to low-anxious 
group when making confidence assessments but not memory judgments, suggesting that rather 
than slowing cognitive processing, high anxiety individuals may be doubting their memory 
ability, resulting in more time spent appraising their performance. In Experiment 2, I tested my 
hypothesis that high-anxious participants are particularly slowed only when asked to critically 
examine and evaluate their memory decisions. The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used 
except that I allowed participants an opportunity to switch their memory responses immediately 
after making an initial classification. Highly anxious participants made more switches in their 
memory judgments and this decreased their overall memory accuracy. Interestingly, in this 
experiment, highly anxious participants did not have lower memory confidence than their low-
anxious peers, nor longer RTs when making confidence judgments. They did however take 
longer when deciding whether to switch an answer. Results are in line with the suggestion that 
high-anxious individuals defer worry until after a memorial decision is made, and that it is in the 
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post-mnemonic stage that high-anxious individuals differ from low-anxious ones. In Experiment 
3, I examined anxiety without induction to determine whether differences in memory accuracy 
and in response time would remain. I also included a manipulation of encoding duration to 
determine whether longer encoding time would improve highly anxious participant’s memory 
accuracy and confidence relative to the low-anxious group. Participants encoded words for either 
750 or 4000 ms. High-anxious individuals had poorer accuracy and lower confidence compared 
to low-anxious individuals: specifically for correct memory responses. Longer encoding duration 
benefited both accuracy and confidence, and there was no differential benefit across groups. RTs 
to make memory classifications again did not differ between groups yet, as in Experiment 1, 
high-anxious participants were slower to make confidence judgments, though only for incorrect 
responses. Results suggest that high-anxious individuals have unrealistically low confidence in 
their memory, especially when correct, and that allowing additional encoding time does not 
alleviate the effect. Taken together, this series of experiments shows that individuals with high 
levels of anxiety take longer to evaluate their memorial decisions, suggesting that they engage in 
more post-mnemonic evaluation than their low-anxious peers.  
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1. General Introduction 
 Anxiety is a negative emotion or state in which worry occurs and there are feelings of 
uneasiness, tension, and nervousness (Liebert & Morries, 1967, Eysenck, 1979). Researchers 
distinguish two types of anxiety. The first is state anxiety, which is a transient emotion that 
interacts with situational threat, and the second is trait anxiety, which is a semi-permanent 
susceptibility to experience state anxiety (Eysenck, 1979). Anxiety has been studied extensively 
with respect to its effects on long term memory accuracy and confidence in both clinical 
(Hermans et al., 2008; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1992; Tuna et al. 2003) and non-clinical (Cheie & 
Visu-Petra, 2012; Dobson & Markham, 2001; Glover & Cravens, 1974; Kizilbash et al., 2002; 
Nolan & Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Salthouse, 2012; Taylor, 1958; Valentine & 
Mesout, 2009) populations. In this thesis, I examined how individual differences in anxiety affect 
memory in the non-clinical population. Specifically, I measured long-term memory accuracy and 
confidence for lists of words, as well as the relation between those variables in university 
undergraduates who had no past history of anxiety disorder, but who had varying levels of state 
and trait anxiety. 
 My motivation for studying the effect of anxiety on memory accuracy and confidence 
was to better understand the wide range of different findings in the literature. When anxiety is 
either experimentally induced or measured as an individual difference, some studies report 
significant memory deficits (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Dobson & Markham, 2001; Glover & 
Cravens, 1974; Salthouse, 2012; Valentine & Mesout, 2009), some null effects (Nolan & 
Markham, 1998; Kizilbash et al., 2002; Taylor, 1958), and some even show memory 
enhancement in the anxious group (Ridley & Clifford, 2006). The effect of anxiety on memory 
confidence, is much clearer however, with studies showing that induced or trait anxiety leads to 
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lower confidence in memorial responses (Nolan & Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; 
Valentine & Mesout 2009).  
The relation between these variables is also poorly understood.  There is disagreement in 
the literature as to whether the low confidence observed in highly anxious (HA) participants is a 
more realistic appraisal of their memory than is the high confidence usually found in low-anxiety 
(LA) groups. Given that lower confidence has been found in all studies that examined both 
memory accuracy and confidence together, researchers have speculated about whether HA 
participants are actually displaying greater insight into their performance and therefore are more 
realistically appraising their responses compared to the LA participants (Nolan & Markham, 
1998). In the normal population, overconfidence is very common (Adams & Adams, 1960; Chua 
et al., 2012, Fichhoff et al., 1977) so lower confidence overall might be a more realistic 
evaluation of one’s memory. This view is opposed by Ridley and Clifford (2006) who found 
near-ceiling performance in their HA group but very low confidence. Instead of seeming more 
self-aware, they argued that the HA participants were unrealistically under-confident. 
The Effect of Anxiety on Memory 
Whether researchers induced anxiety in their studies seems to have influenced the pattern 
of memory performance. For example, Dobson and Markham (2001) found a decrease in 
memory for a sequence of events depicting a crime in an HA relative to LA group of 
participants, but only when anxiety was manipulated (by way of ego threat) at both encoding and 
retrieval. Notably, however, the difference in memory performance was not due to decreased 
performance in the HA group, but instead to an increase in the LA group. Such a finding 
suggests that the researcher’s manipulation had a selective motivating effect on the LA group 
rather than a detrimental effect in the HA group. Another study by Nolan and Markham (1998) 
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found no differences in memory performance following anxiety induction at retrieval. Similarly, 
Taylor (1958) found that under low stress, without induction, HA participants recalled more 
nonsense syllables than LA. However, after an anxiety induction of ego threat however, the HA 
and LA groups showed a similar rate of decrease in performance. This suggests that some 
anxiety manipulations may be motivating rather than detrimental to both HA and LA groups. 
While these studies did not find significant memory deficits in HA participants following 
anxiety induction, others (Deffenbacher et al., 2004, Valentine & Mesout, 2009) have reported a 
negative association between heightened anxiety and memory. Deffenbacher and colleagues’ 
(2004) meta-analysis of eyewitness studies showed that induced anxiety led to poorer memory 
performance, especially when anxiety was accompanied by high levels of physiological arousal. 
However, the experiments that they reviewed did not separate participants based on individual 
differences in trait anxiety, and even the authors state that since HA and LA participants may 
respond differentially to stress, they should be assessed separately (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). 
While this meta-analysis emphasized the importance of arousal, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) 
found that impaired performance can be found in a HA group even without supporting arousal 
data. Not all experiments collect physiological data, though one that did (Valentine & Mesout, 
2009) sorted their participants into HA and LA groups based on self-reported state anxiety. 
Physiological data were collected as a manipulation check and were found to account for a 
significant portion of variance in state anxiety scores. The researchers found that the HA group 
was significantly worse at identifying a confederate that had frightened them while walking 
through an environment designed to elevate anxiety by the presentation of frightening stimuli. 
Overall, these experiments showed that an induction that is designed to elevate anxiety may also 
be motivating for LA participants, complicating conclusions about the effect of anxiety on 
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memory. In addition, anxiety inductions appear to produce more anxiety in those who are high in 
trait anxiety than those who are not, suggesting that it is critical to consider individual 
differences in susceptibility to anxiety when examining how this manipulation affects memory. 
There have also been studies that focused more exclusively on individual differences in 
anxiety without induction. It can be argued that the experiments that manipulated anxiety were 
merely exaggerating underlying differences in trait anxiety, effects which may remain without 
induction. Two such studies were carried out. One was by Salthouse (2012) with volunteers 
recruited from the community and another was by Kizilbash and colleagues (2002) with 
Vietnam-era veterans. Salthouse found that trait anxiety was negatively associated with memory 
performance on a variety of tasks including word recall and paired associates in his regression 
analysis. Depression symptoms, age, gender, and health were all controlled for and there was a 
highly varied sample of people tested (e.g., age range of 18-97, various careers, levels of 
education, etc.). In contrast, Kizilbash and colleagues (2002) did not find an effect of trait 
anxiety levels in a large sample of Vietnam-era veterans on memory. However, they did find that 
those with co-morbid anxiety and depression had significantly reduced performance. 
Unfortunately, this study had relatively few participants who were only trait anxious (n = 47) and 
far more participants with comorbid anxiety and depression (n = 416) which means that there 
may not have been enough participants to make the effect of trait anxiety alone significant. Thus, 
overall, the literature is divided as to whether elevated state or trait anxiety produces deficits or 
null effects on memory performance.  
In the three experiments that form this Master’s thesis, sub-clinically anxious individuals 
were classified by their self-reported state and trait anxiety which was collected using the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Exp. 1 and 2) and the State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and 
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Somatic Anxiety (STICSA) (Exp. 3).  Participants were either separated into groups using the 
average from normative data as a cut-off point (Exp. 1 and 2) or by conducting a median split 
(Exp. 3). There was not a distinction made between state and trait anxiety because in all 
experiments both were highly correlated. In Experiment 1, it was also attempted to better 
quantify the level of anxiety experienced by participants by collecting skin conductance data. 
Skin conductance is a well-established method of measuring physiological responses, such as 
arousal, that has been used since the 1930’s (Bitterman & Holtzman, 1952). However, arousal 
does not always indicate higher levels of anxiety as other factors can also increase skin 
conductance such as motivation. It was hoped that the HA and LA groups would have different 
levels of physiological arousal and that would provide additional evidence of the anxiety 
manipulation affecting the HA group more than the LA. 
Processing Efficiency Theory 
 
 One theory that aims to account for the divergent findings with respect to effects of high 
state or trait anxiety on memory is the processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992). Consistent with the earlier ‘drive theory’ (derived from Hullian theory; Taylor, 1956), 
PET states that HA persons have a greater desire to perform well and therefore under normal 
conditions will tend to outscore LA participants (Eysenck, 1979). Under stressful conditions, 
however, PET posits that those with high trait anxiety are more likely to experience state anxiety 
which leads to worry (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). In turn, worry is thought to tax working memory 
by dividing capacity between task relevant activities and task irrelevant worry. The load of worry 
on working memory is assumed to create more barriers for speed and efficiency of processing 
than for performance effectiveness.  Thus, HA participants should still exhibit a strong desire to 
succeed (as in drive theory), however this drive may not be able to compensate for their 
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increased working memory load. As such, PET predicts that under low stress conditions, HA 
participants should either outperform or perform at the same level as LA participants. However, 
when stress in introduced, HA participants should experience a decrease in performance and 
slowed processing speed (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992).  
 Unfortunately, PET has not been extensively examined or tested using long term memory 
paradigms. Researchers have primarily focused on working memory and various other cognitive 
tasks. Previous research (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Dobson & Markham, 2001; Glover & 
Cravens, 1974; Kizilbash et al., 2002; Nolan and Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; 
Salthouse, 2012; Taylor, 1958; Valentine & Mesout, 2009) did not analyze response time which 
is vital to test predictions from PET, given that the main distinguishing feature is slowed 
processing before a decrease in performance is observed. If PET is an accurate representation of 
the effect of anxiety on memory, it would be expected that every experiment that showed a 
deficit in memory accuracy would have an accompanying response time difference between the 
LA and HA groups. As well, in experiments that did not find an accuracy deficit, a response time 
slowing would be predicted in the HA group. 
Factors Influencing Memory Confidence 
 
Memory confidence is another way of assessing the quality of one’s memory. Many 
factors affect memory and confidence in different ways which is why in this thesis both accuracy 
and confidence were examined. As discussed in the previous section, anxiety occasionally affects 
memory confidence and accuracy in the same way but this is not always true. Other factors such 
as familiarity (Chua et al., 2012; Fischhoff et al., 1977) and repeated questioning (Shaw & 
McClure, 1996) have divergent effects on memory and confidence in the literature. Familiarity 
can increase confidence but not accuracy for general knowledge (Fischhoff et al. 1977) if a well-
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known association is misleading. For example, participants in Fischhoff and colleagues’ (1977) 
experiment were quite certain that potatoes originated from Ireland as that association is very 
common in our culture, despite potatoes actually originating from Peru. Researchers stated that 
this experiment shows the reconstructive and deceptive nature of memory for facts as 
participants recalled hearing or learning the incorrect information. Such research shows 
divergent influences on memory confidence and accuracy. As for repeated questioning, a 
manipulation used in this thesis, Shaw and McClure (1996) had participants view a staged event 
in class and then questioned them about it five times over five consecutive weeks. The memory 
test began with a few questions and each week it increased in size while maintaining the earlier 
questions.  It was found that by the last test, confidence had increased significantly for the items 
that had been tested five times; importantly, however, accuracy remained constant. 
In contrast, other studies have shown that experimental manipulations can affect memory 
accuracy and confidence in very similar ways. For example, when testing memory in a forced-
choice paradigm, deliberate reasoning will either increase or decrease both confidence and 
accuracy together (Chua et al., 2012). Deliberate reasoning is described as the ability of a 
participant to make a memory decision based on logic rather than a strong memory. For example, 
if the participants had to pick out memorized words from two options, if the original list had only 
contained words related to furniture and the lures were all bird names, the participants would 
have very high accuracy and confidence.  Response fluency, how quickly a person brings a 
memory to mind and responds, also increases accuracy and confidence concurrently (Robinson 
et al., 1997, Shaw et al., 2001). 
As discussed above, some manipulations can affect memory and confidence in divergent 
ways and anxiety occasionally has divergent effects on these variables. Some researchers have 
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found that both memory accuracy and confidence decreased in a group of HA individuals 
(Dodson & Markham, 2001; Valentine & Mesout, 2009) while others have found that accuracy 
was not affected, though confidence was very low (Nolan & Markham, 1998; Ridley & Cifford, 
2006). Because confidence has been found to be consistently low in HA participants I introduced 
two manipulations in my thesis: the ability to change responses, a form of repeated questioning, 
and longer encoding durations in an attempt to increase confidence in this group. These 
manipulations will be discussed in greater detail in Experiments 2 and 3.  
The Relation between Memory Accuracy and Confidence 
 
Given that lower confidence has been found in HA participants in all studies that 
examined both memory and confidence together, researchers have speculated about whether HA 
participants are actually displaying greater insight into their performance and therefore are more 
realistically appraising their memory performance compared to LA participants. Overconfidence 
has been found in many studies and it has been suggested that in general, people are often 
overly-confident that they are correct (Adams & Adams, 1960; Chua et al., 2012; Fichhoff et al., 
1977). 
In a study by Nolan and Markham (1998), the HA group showed a significant correlation 
between accuracy and confidence at 0.60, whereas there was no significant correlation in the LA 
group. This led to the conclusion that HA participants may be more self-aware and have 
improved insight into their performance compared to LA participants. Such findings are in 
contrast to those of Ridley and Clifford (2006), who found that despite memory for the contents 
of a video portraying a crime being near ceiling in a group of HA participants, they reported low 
confidence in their memory judgments compared to the LA participants who achieved lower 
memory scores. Ridley and Clifford’s memory test was made up of sentences that described 
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either veridical details or false information from the video participants had just watched. While 
the accuracy-confidence correlation was not tested statistically in that study, the authors argued 
that since the HA group had highly accurate memories, their low confidence was unrealistic.  
The difference in the strength of the association between accuracy and confidence, across 
these two studies, may be methodological. Nolan and Markham (1998) induced anxiety prior to 
encoding; Ridley and Clifford (2006), on the other hand, simply assessed levels of state and trait 
anxiety in their participants without manipulation. According to PET, high state anxiety produces 
excessive worry or thoughts of task evaluation (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). The anxiety 
manipulation in Nolan and Markham’s study likely further increased focus on appraisals of 
performance, leading to more realistic confidence judgments. Yet, given that worry is also 
thought to slow processing (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), it is possible that HA individuals perceived 
tasks as more difficult than LA participants and therefore reported lower confidence overall, as 
in the Ridley and Clifford (2006) study. 
In my thesis, I sought to clarify the accuracy-confidence relation by computing Gamma 
correlations for HA versus LA individuals, instead a Pearson correlation coefficient (Bornstein & 
Zickafoose, 1999). A Gamma correlation is derived from the chi squared statistic and is a 
nonparametric correlation measure. It is considered best measure of resolution, how effectively 
confidence corresponds to correct and incorrect recognitions, as it takes into account all 
responses and not overall performance (Krug, 2007). Confidence is correlated positively with 
accuracy if confidence is greater for correct than incorrect responses (Nelson, 1984). In this way, 
higher Gamma correlations are taken as evidence of better meta-memory insight. This statistic is 
particularly suited for examining differences between HA and LA participants as it distinguishes 
individual item performance (unlike point biserial correlations), and not a person’s overall 
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confidence level (Nelson, 1984). Since it has been shown that HA individuals have lower 
confidence in general (Nolan & Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Valentine & Mesout, 
2009) it is beneficial in this group to look at the relative difference between accurate and 
inaccurate responses instead of overall confidence. Other measures of the accuracy-confidence 
relation, such as calibration, do not consider confidence separately for correct and incorrect 
classifications, but simply plot confidence and percentage accuracy on a given memory test 
(Krug, 2007). Gamma correlations are also suggested when using a scale to measure confidence 
(1 to 6 in my experiments) rather than a percentage score (0%-100% confident) (Krug, 2007).  
 The literature is divided as to what the effect of anxiety is on long-term memory 
accuracy, confidence, and the relation between them. Therefore in this thesis, I sought to 
elucidate findings such as the possibility of a processing speed deficit in HA individuals and 
expand on others, specifically the relation between confidence and accuracy in HA compared to 
LA participants. I also endeavoured to produce conditions in which HA participants would not 
have deficits in memory or confidence, by allowing participants to change their memory 
classification (Experiment 2), and by allowing a longer encoding time (Experiment 3). In each 
experiment, memory confidence, accuracy, response time, and the accuracy-confidence relation 
were examined to provide a clear picture of how memory is affected by anxiety. By collecting 
data for each of these variables simultaneously, predictions from PET were tested directly. It was 
also explored whether the lower level of confidence found in HA participants, represents a more 
realistic judgment of one’s memory accuracy. This question is important to clarify as it has not 
yet been established if lower confidence in HA individuals is actually a realistic or unrealistic 
evaluation of their memory. Overall, this thesis endevoured to provide a wealth of data 
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demonstrating the differences between HA and LA participants and to determine whether there 
exist any conditions which could make the HA group appear more similar to their LA peers. 
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2. Experiment 1: Effect of Anxiety Induction on Long Term Memory 
The purpose of the first experiment was to establish whether deficits to memory accuracy 
and confidence could be demonstrated in an HA group in my paradigm given that findings are 
not consistent in the literature. The methods used that were close to those of Dodson and 
Markham (2001) in that anxiety was manipulated specifically after encoding and also used a 
recognition test to assess memory. Because memory performance has been varied in HA 
participants in the literature, as discussed in the general introduction, in order to determine 
whether memory accuracy as well as confidence would be impaired when using these methods. 
In this experiment, memory performance and confidence were assessed in HA and LA 
participants following an anxiety induction. In addition, the relation between memory accuracy 
and confidence was also examined. Response time was also recorded and analyzed to determine 
whether memory and confidence decisions take longer in HA than LA participants to test the 
assumptions of PET. That is, if HA participants would experience a processing efficiency deficit 
(increased RTs) before or simultaneously with a decrement in processes effectiveness (memory 
accuracy). In Experiment 1 (as well as Experiment 2), an anxiety manipulation was administered 
to all participants and groups were formed based on each participant’s self-reported level of state 
anxiety during the experiment. (While state anxiety was used in Experiments 1 and 2 to group 
participants, group membership would have remained the same even if they were created based 
on trait anxiety scores due to the high degree of correlation between state and trait anxiety). In 
Experiment 1, physiological data was collected using skin conductance which measured arousal. 
It was hoped that skin conductance would provide further evidence of differences in anxiety 
between the HA and LA group as anxiety is often associated with heightened arousal (Bitterman 
& Holtzman, 1952). It was thought that skin conductance would be higher overall in the HA 
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group based on the findings of Valentine and Mesout (2009), but be particularly elevated during 
the anxiety induction. 
In Experiment 1, anxiety was manipulated by having participants engage in one of two 
challenging cognitive tasks to be completed under time pressure, which has been found to be 
stressful for anxious participants (Mattarella-Micke et al. 2011). The Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (Raven et al., 1983) was used which is a standardized IQ test and a mathematics test 
that was composed of questions involving carrying, which math anxious individuals in particular 
find specifically anxiety-inducing (Mattarella-Micke et al. 2011). Two different inductions were 
used because it was thought that there would be a different level of anxiety induced by each one. 
It was hypothesized that the math test might be more anxiety-inducing in the population tested, 
which had a high level of math anxiety as well as general trait anxiety, than the Raven’s 
Matrices, which are pattern- rather than number-based. 
To better characterize the influence of anxiety on memory and confidence ratings, a 
recognition test was administered in which different types of memory responses could be 
examined: correct (hits and correct rejections) and incorrect (false alarms and misses). In so 
doing, I hoped to provide converging evidence that anxiety is linked to decreased memory 
confidence and accuracy, and to test PET (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) by comparing response times 
between HA and LA participants. 
2.1 Method 
 
Participants. 60 undergraduate participants from the University of Waterloo took part in the 
experiment. The participants were separated into groups based on their scores of state anxiety on 
the STAI (Speilberger et al., 1983). Participants were split into high (n = 30) and low (n = 30) 
anxiety groups based on normative data (Speilberger et al., 1983) for each gender of college 
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students. Females scoring 39 and higher and males scoring 37 and higher were included in the 
HA group (6 male, mean Age = 19.73, sd = 2.28, mean Years of Education = 14.17, sd = 1.05) 
and all participants scoring below were included in the LA group (10 male, mean Age = 20.83, 
sd = 3.48, mean Years of Education = 14.87, sd = 1.11). Data from 11 other participants were 
excluded from analyses: 4 participants scored zero on the memory test, suggesting they did not 
follow instructions, and 7 participants were excluded due to experimental equipment failure. All 
participants had never been diagnosed, been treated for, or currently had depression or clinical 
anxiety disorders. 
 The groups had significantly different levels of state (the grouping variable) and trait 
anxiety. I instructed participants to report their feelings at the time of test (state anxiety) and how 
they felt in everyday life (trait anxiety). Contrasts showed that the HA group had significantly 
higher state (t (58) = 11.10, p < 0.001) and trait (t (58) = 5.38, p < 0.001) anxiety than the LA 
group. For means and standard deviations, see Table 1. 
Table 1 
 Mean (and standard deviation) state and trait anxiety scores for the HA and LA groups 
Group State Anxiety Trait Anxiety 
Low Anxious 28.90 (3.28) 34.63 (8.63) 
   
High Anxious 45.13 (7.30) 48.70 (11.42) 
 
Design Overview. The dependent variables were memory accuracy and confidence ratings for 
recognition decisions. I compared accuracy and response times in the two groups of participants. 
Following an initial encoding phase for a word list, an anxiety-inducing mathematics test or the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven et al., 1983) was administered to all participants.  
Subsequently, the retrieval phase for the word memory task began. It was assumed that the 
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influence of the anxiety manipulation would last for at least 2-3 minutes (Ononaiye et al., 2007). 
The success of the manipulation in increasing arousal was assessed skin conductance and a self-
report questionnaire. 
Memory Task. Two word lists were created for visual presentation on the computer.  These 
were selected from the ‘Affective Norms of English’ (ANEW) database containing normative 
ratings of English words for valence, arousal, and dominance (the perceived degree of control 
expressed by the stimulus) rated on a 1-9 scale (Bradley & Lang, 1999), as well as word 
frequencies (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  Two 30-word lists were created, equated based on 
ANEW ratings of valence, arousal, word frequency, letter length, and dominance. All words 
were concrete nouns of medium frequency and between four and seven letters in length. An 
additional 5-word list was created for study use in a practice phase, and another 5 words to be 
used as lures in practice, using the same criteria as in the experimental phase. All words were 
presented in a random order in 20-point Arial font in black on a white background, centered on a 
computer screen. 
Skin Conductance . Skin conductance was measured using the Affectiva Q 1.0 sensor 
(Affectiva Inc., Santa Clara, CA). This device is similar in appearance and weight to a wrist 
watch and was placed snugly on the participant’s non-dominate wrist.  Two sensors sent a small 
electric current between each other measured conductance while in contact with the participants’ 
skin.  The skin conductance device was mounted on the participant’s wrist following their 
informed consent. 
Anxiety Induction. The anxiety-inducing tasks were both completed using a pencil and paper. I 
used two different tasks: a mathematics test and Raven’s Progressive Matrices. The mathematics 
test consisted of 4 pages of basic mathematical problems that could all be solved without the use 
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of a calculator. All questions involved either addition, subtraction, division, or multiplication, or 
combinations of these. The questions all involved carrying, multiple steps, or long division 
which have been shown to arouse mathematics anxiety (Mattarella-Micke et al. 2011). The four 
basic math operations were used in an effort to reduce boredom in those who did not find the 
task difficult. It was explained to participants before the test that if they forget how to perform a 
certain operation, for example long division that they should move on to the next section in an 
effort to reduce the possibility of participants giving up. Given the length of this task, 
participants were not expected to be able to complete it in the time given. 
 The Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven et al. 1983) was also used as an anxiety 
induction. The Raven’s involves viewing a 3 x 3 matrix with a specific pattern and choosing the 
piece out of 8 available options to complete the pattern. The pattern is different for each new 
matrix.  Usually participants have a total of 40 minutes to complete as much of the two booklets 
as they can. IQ is calculated by subtracting incorrect and incomplete answers from correct ones. 
Unlike the mathematics test, questions in the Raven’s do not require prerequisite knowledge; 
therefore participants were instructed not to skip any questions. The children’s version of the RP 
was also included in case a participant finished the adult test and also made the task appear 
longer. 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. SC, used to measure 
physiological arousal, was averaged at four different 2-minute time intervals. The first interval 
was called ‘Baseline SC’ and occurred while the participant was resting comfortably awaiting 
task instructions. The second was called “Encoding SC” and occurred during the memory 
encoding phase of the experiment, starting concurrently with presentation of the first word on the 
study list. The third was called ‘Arousal Induction SC’ and occurred 2 minutes after the 
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participant began the arousal induction test. The forth was called ‘Retrieval SC’ and began at the 
start of the recognition memory task. 
 Prior to commencing the experimental phase, participants completed a practice memory 
test consisting of 5 study words and 10 words on the recognition test (half old), to familiarize 
participants with stimulus presentation and timing. For the memory task, stimulus presentation 
and response recording was controlled using E-prime v.1.1 software (Psychology Software Tools 
Inc., Pittsburg, PA). A 17” computer monitor was used to present participants with word stimuli. 
Participants were required to make responses with their dominant hand using a standard 
keyboard. During encoding, words from list 1 were presented in a random order in 20 point Arial 
font, centered on the computer screen. Each was shown for 4 seconds in black lettering against a 
white background display, followed by a fixation cross for 1 second. List 2 words were used as 
lures on the recognition test. Word lists were counterbalanced across participants such that each 
list served as “study” for half of the participants in each anxiety group. 
The participant then moved to a second desk where the anxiety induction took place. Half 
of the participants in each group were given the mathematics test and half the Raven’s 
Progressive Matricies. The participant had 10 minutes to work on the anxiety-inducing task, 
starting from the moment they acknowledged understanding the task. When the 10 minutes 
ended, the participant returned to the computer desk. 
For the retrieval phase, participants were shown a list of words, half of which were from 
the study list. For each recognition memory trial, a word was presented on the screen for 3 
seconds. Participants were asked to make an ‘old’ or ‘new’ decision about the word by pressing 
the appropriate key, the “n” key had a sticker labelled “Y” affixed to it, to indicate “yes had seen 
before/old”, and the “m” key had a sticker labelled “N”, to indicate “no had not seen 
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before/new”. These keys were chosen as they are easy to reach with one hand. Next, a screen 
was presented for 3 seconds, asking participants to make a rating to indicate their confidence in 
their memory judgment. Confidence ratings were to be made on a 6 point scale: 1-2 indicating 
not very confident, 3-4 indicating moderately confident, and 5-6 indicating very confident. A 
fixation cross appeared for 500 milliseconds in between word recognition trials. After the 
memory test was completed, participants were asked to complete the STAI both state and trait. 
2.2 Results 
 
Memory Accuracy. A univariate ANOVA was conducted using d’ memory accuracy 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) as the dependent measure, with Anxiety Induction (mathematics 
test or Raven’s Progressive Matrices), List (1 and 2), and State Anxiety Group (HA and LA)) as 
between-participant factors. The effect of Group was approaching significance, F (1, 52) = 3.52, 
MSE = 0.85, ηp
2
 = 0.06, p = 0.07 with the HA group scoring lower on the memory test (mean = 
1.69, sd = 0.91) than the LA group (mean = 2.18, sd = 0.94). There was no effect of List (F < 1) 
or Anxiety Induction (F (1, 52) = 1.83, MSE = 0.85, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 0.18) and no significant 
interactions. 
Pearson correlations were also computed for memory performance and RTs. Memory 
performance was negatively correlated with state anxiety, r (58) = -0.39, p < 0.01. State anxiety 
and RT to make hits, false alarms, misses and correct rejections were uncorrelated. Therefore, it 
was demonstrated that with this paradigm, HA participants had worse performance on the 
memory task and higher anxiety was associated with poorer performance. 
Memory Response Times. RTs to make memorial decisions were analyzed with a mixed 
ANOVA with Group (HA and LA) as a between participant factor and Response Type (hits, 
false alarms, misses, and correct rejections) as a within participants factor.  There was a main 
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effect of Response Type F (3, 156) = 26.08, MSE = 59371.07, ηp
2
 = 0.33, p < 0.001, with hits 
having the fastest RTs, followed by correct rejections, misses, and then false alarms.  There was 
no effect of Group (F < 1) and the interaction was not significant (F < 1). Therefore, HA 
participants did not have a processing speed deficit as predicted by PET but were able to make 
recognition decisions as quickly as their LA peers. 
Memory Confidence. The analysis for confidence was done using the method commonly used 
in the field which includes comparing correct to incorrect responses (Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 
1999). Confidence was analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with Accuracy (correct and incorrect) 
as the within-participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the between-participants factor. 
Correct responses were classified as hits and correct rejections and false alarms and misses were 
classified as incorrect responses. There was a main effect of Group, F (1, 55) = 11.53, MSE = 
1.01, ηp
2
 = 0.17, p = 0.001, with the HA group reporting lower confidence than the LA group. 
There was also a main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 55) = 77.84, MSE = 0.30, ηp
2 
= 0.59, p < 0.001, 
such that correct responses were given higher confidence ratings than incorrect responses. There 
was not a significant interaction: Accuracy x Group F (1, 55) = 1.04, MSE = 1.01, ηp
2 
= 0.02, p = 
0.31. For means and standard deviations, see Table 2. HA participants reported lower confidence 
than their LA peers in their memorial responses which is consistent with the literature. 
Table 2 
 Mean (and standard deviation in parentheses) confidence ratings in HA and LA participants for 
correct and incorrect responses 
 Group Correct Incorrect 
Low Anxious 5.09 (0.52) 4.20 (1.19) 
   
High Anxious 4.46 (0.57) 3.58 (0.75) 
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Confidence Response Times. RTs to make confidence ratings for each memory decision were 
analyzed in a mixed ANOVA as well, with Accuracy (correct and incorrect) as the within 
participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the between participants factor.  There was a main 
effect of Group, F (1, 57) = 7.25, MSE = 138544.05, ηp
2 
= 0.11, p = 0.009, with the HA group 
taking significantly longer to respond. There was also a main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 57) = 
21.75, MSE = 25101.97, ηp
2 
= 0.28, p < 0.001. The interaction was not significant, F (1, 57) = 
1.94, MSE = 25102.97, ηp
2 
= 0.03, p = 0.17. Therefore, HA participants do have a processing 
speed deficit as predicted by PET but in this design it was found in confidence judgments rather 
than memorial decisions. For means and standard deviations, see Table 3. 
Table 3 
 Median (and Standard Deviation in parentheses) RTs to make confidence ratings in HA and LA 
Participants 
 Group Correct Incorrect 
Low Anxious 777 (243) 953 (327) 
   
High Anxious 1002 (261) 1097 (304) 
 
Accuracy-Confidence Relation. To examine the relation between accuracy and confidence, I 
calculated Goodman-Kruskal (1954) Gamma coefficients for each person at each of the two 
durations. Responses in each of the 6 confidence bins were tabulated for correct and for incorrect 
memory responses for each participant, and these values were used to calculate Gamma which, 
like Pearson’s r, gives a value between -1 to +1.  A score of +1 would require all of a person’s 
correct responses to be assigned very high confidence (6) and their incorrect responses to be 
assigned very low confidence (1) without variation. A negative Gamma value would result if a 
participant assigned confidence in the opposite manner, high for incorrect and low for correct. A 
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Gamma value close to 0 would result if one assigned the same confidence to all response types 
or assigned values randomly. The resulting Gamma correlations were analyzed using an 
independent t-test. There was no significant effect of Group, t(58) = 0.54, p = 0.59. The HA 
group had a mean gamma score of 0.44 (0.26) and the LA a mean of 0.49 (0.38). This means that 
both groups confidence is equally predictive of memory accuracy; neither group is more realistic 
than the other in their confidence ratings. Therefore, the HA groups is not more realistic in their 
confidence judgements despite reporting less confidence than the LA group. 
Skin Conductance. I measured skin conductance in microSiemens (μS) during 4 recording 
blocks. Before any comparisons could be made between groups on skin conductance, data were 
converted to account for individual differences in baseline reactivity. The Rose’s Range 
correction was used (Lykken et al. 1966): 
Converted value =              SCix  -  SCmin__    
                                           SCmax - SCmin 
 
where SCix is the value under examination, SCmin is the lowest value recorded by the participant 
being analyzed and SCmax is the highest recorded value. 
A mixed ANOVA was also conducted to examine the results of skin conductance, with 
Group (HA and LA) and Anxiety Induction (mathamatics test and Raven’s Progressive Matrices) 
as between-participants factors, and Recording Block (baseline, encoding, arousal induction, and 
recognition) as the within-participants factor. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant for all 
of the following ANOVAs so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for all F statistics. 
There was a main effect of Recording Block, F (1.40, 100.35) = 9.83, MSE = 0.14, ηp
2 
= 0.15, p 
< 0.001, but no main effect of either Group (F < 1) or Anxiety Induction, F (1, 56) = 1.57, MSE 
= 0.07, ηp
2 
= 0.03, p = 0.21.  There were two significant interactions, Recording Block x Anxiety 
Induction, F (1.79, 100.35) = 3.16, MSE = 0.14, ηp
2 
= 0.05, p = 0.03, and Group x Anxiety 
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Induction, F (1, 56) = 6.01, MSE = 0.07, ηp
2 
= 0.02, p = 0.02.  All other interactions were non-
significant (Fs < 1). 
To explore the Anxiety Induction interactions, I ran 2 separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs, one for each Anxiety Induction (mathematics test and Raven’s Progressive Matrices) 
with Recording Block (baseline, encoding, arousal induction, and recognition) as the within 
participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the between participants factor.  For the 
mathematics test there was only a main effect of Block F (2.27, 63.50) = 13.03, MSE = 0.10, ηp
2 
= 0.32, p < 0.001 but no main effect of Group or interaction.  For Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
there was no effect of Block or interaction but there was a main effect of Group F (1, 28) = 4.79, 
MSE = 0.07, ηp
2 
= 0.04, p < 0.05.  In Raven’s, the LA Group had higher levels of arousal than the 
HA group. These results do not support the prediction that skin conductance would be higher in 
the HA than the LA group. There is also not a clear pattern across anxiety inductions. 
2.3 Discussion 
 
In the current study I considered the effect of anxiety on recognition memory and also 
examined the participants’ confidence in their recognition judgments. My results provide 
converging evidence with past studies suggesting that confidence ratings of memories are 
reduced following anxiety-induction in anxious participants (Dobson & Markham, 2001; Nolan 
& Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Valentine & Mesout 2009). I provided converging 
evidence that anxiety can reduce memory performance (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Deffenbacher 
et al., 2004; Dobson & Markham, 2001; Glover & Cravens, 1974; Salthouse, 2012; Valentine & 
Mesout, 2009). Response times were found to be longer in the HA group, consistent with PET, 
but only for confidence judgments and not memorial classifications. I also found that the 
confidence and accuracy relation was not differentially predictive across the two groups.  
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Several of my results map well on to Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) PET, such as the 
decrease in memory confidence and accuracy, but the RT predictions found less support. The 
theory predicts that HA individuals experience more worry than their LA counterparts which in 
turn leads to slowing of their cognitive processes. I did not find that RTs were longer for the HA 
group on a binary memory decision, but I did find a nearly 200 ms delay in the HA group when 
making confidence judgments. At first glance, such a pattern may seem out of line with PET, but 
it could be that the HA group was deferring their task performance worry until the confidence 
rating stage. PET states that the worry experienced in HA participants is related to task concerns. 
Post-decisional processes, in this experiment confidence ratings, were more affected than the 
initial memorial decisions. This finding suggests an amendment to PET such that worry slows 
only post-decisional processes but not recognition decisions. Studies in the past that examined 
anxiety, confidence, and memory, did not report RTs (Dobson & Markham, 2001, Nolan & 
Markham, 1998, Ridley & Clifford, 2006) precluding comparison of my findings to others. 
The correlations and comparisons between anxiety and memory accuracy, as well as 
confidence, are more in line with PET. Poorer memory was associated with higher levels of state 
anxiety. Unlike in the study by Dobson and Markham (2001), which instead of showing a 
detriment in the HA group showed improvement in the LA group, I can be reasonably certain 
that my manipulation decreased the performance of the HA group. Support comes from the 
significant negative correlation between state anxiety and memory accuracy. My results are in 
line with those of Valentine and Mesout (2009) who also found that state anxiety was associated 
with decreased memory, perhaps because I, like Valentine and Mesout (2009), had long-lasting 
anxiety manipulations that may have significantly elevated state anxiety in the HA group. 
24 
 
My results also support PET and replicate past findings showing lower memory 
confidence in HA compared to LA groups. Interestingly, even though the HA group was less 
confident in their memorial ability, their confidence was equally as predictive of accuracy as the 
LA group. Practically, this could be detrimental to HA individuals in everyday life as those who 
are less confident are seen as less reliable when reporting their memories (Deffencbacher et al., 
2004). Indeed, Nolan and Markham (1998) found that the HA group was perceived by observers 
to be less confident, in line with what the group members report themselves. Also, given that HA 
participants took longer to make confidence decisions, HA individuals may require more time to 
complete school tests because they do not have enough confidence that their responses are 
correct. 
Skin conductance was not found to be higher in the HA than the LA group and it also was 
not correlated with either measures of memory accuracy or confidence. While this may seem 
counter-intuitive, previous studies have reported similar findings to mine: the HA reporting high 
levels of anxiety while having similar physiological responses to those in the LA group (Holroyd 
et al., 1978). Eysenck and Calvo (1992) noted that physiological arousal appears to have a very 
minor role in mediating the relation between anxiety and performance. I was optimistic that the 
extended length of the anxiety manipulation would increase skin conductance but this was not 
found; given this, skin conductance was not recorded in Experiments 2 and 3. 
 As I found that the HA group took more time to make confidence judgments, I was 
interested in exploring what HA participants were doing with this extra time. In Experiment 2, 
participants were given an opportunity to change their responses as a way of determining 
whether anxious participants were critically analysing or “second-guessing” their responses prior 
to making confidence judgments, thereby accounting for those longer RTs. 
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3. Experiment 2: Anxiety and Response Switching 
 In Experiment 1, I found that HA participants were taking longer to make confidence 
decisions, but not memory decisions, relative to their LA peers. This led me to question what the 
HA participants were doing during that time. It is possible that they were critically analyzing 
their responses as Eysenck and Calvo (1992) suggest that anxious participant spend time 
engaged in worry which in the context of an experimental task could be task-focused. Given this 
assumption, I hypothesized that HA participants might benefit from a chance to alter their 
responses if they were indeed focused on the accuracy of their decisions. 
 Answer switching has been studied in the literature but mainly in the context of multiple 
choice tests. It has been consistently found that when participants make response changes they 
overwhelmingly improve test scores despite prevailing myths that answer switches are 
inadvisable (Welch & Leichner, 1988; Geiger, 1991; Kruger et al., 2005). Most studies in this 
area use data from real tests in university classes. One of these studies also examined confidence 
and found that though 70% of participants had in fact increased scores though switches, they felt 
confident that they had done worse on the test because of it (Geiger, 1991). Green (1981) 
examined individual differences in test anxiety among graduate students taking a first year 
statistics course. The researcher found that high test-anxious participants made more switches 
overall and also had slightly lower net test scores as they switched more often to incorrect 
responses. In the current experiment, I gave participants a chance to change their responses on 
the memory task.  
 I decided to discontinue use of the skin conductance recording device as my recordings 
did not detect a difference between the HA and LA group. To determine if the anxiety 
manipulation was indeed effective and to ensure that participants did not have elevated levels of 
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anxiety before the anxiety induction, I administered the STAI for most of my participants, both 
before the experiment began and after it ended. I then examined these self-reported scores (for 
state only) to ensure that the HA group was increasing in anxiety after the manipulation rather 
than simply having a high baseline level.  
 I expected to replicate findings that the HA would make more answer switches than the 
LA group for two reasons. It had been found in the literature previously (Green, 1981) and 
because the HA spent more time making confidence judgments in Experiment 1 than the LA 
group, which may indicate a greater propensity to consider responses critically. As for 
confidence, two outcomes seemed reasonably possible. One was that, after switching, confidence 
would decrease as participants have been found previously to believe they would do worse after 
making change responses (Geiger, 1991; Kruger et al., 2005). The other possibility was that 
confidence would increase as one study observed that, in an eyewitness context, repeated 
questioning led to higher confidence over time (Shaw & McClure, 1996). I also expected that 
confidence would be lower in the HA group as it was in Experiment 1 and longer response times 
specifically for responses after the first memorial response. I predicted that the HA would have 
lower memory accuracy than the LA group before answer switching, as in the first experiment, 
but higher afterward based on the idea that they were realistically assessing their performance. 
3.1 Method 
 
Participants. Overall, 65 participants took part in this experiment and 59 were included in the 
final analysis. The 6 participants who were excluded scored below chance on the memory test 
suggesting that they were not following instructions. Participants were divided into HA (n = 24) 
and LA (n = 35) groups based on their STAI score from when it was administered after the 
experiment was completed (Speilberger et al., 1983) by the same criteria as Experiment 1. There 
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were no significant differences in age (HA mean = 19.54 (1.35), LA mean = 19.57 (1.53)) or 
years of education (HA mean = 14.46 (1.35), LA mean = 14.37 (1.45) between groups. 
 There were significant differences in state anxiety between groups, which was recorded 
before and after the task for most participants (23 or ~1/3 participants did not complete the pre-
test state anxiety scale), and trait anxiety recorded at the end of the experiment. State anxiety was 
recorded twice in two thirds of participants as I realized after starting data collection that without 
the skin confuctance recording, a manipulation check was required. The HA group reported 
higher state anxiety before test, t(34) = 9.59, p = 0.001, and after test, t(57) = 17.82, p < 0.0001, 
and higher trait anxiety, t(57) = 13.17, p < 0.001, than the LA group (see Table 4 for means and 
standard deviations), indicating that my manipulation was successful in elevating anxiety. 
Importantly, state anxiety increased after the task only for the HA (t (15) = 2.34, p = 0.04) and 
not for the LA (t (21) = 0.48, p = 0.64) group. 
Table 4 
 Mean (and standard deviation) state and trait anxiety scores for the HA and LA groups 
 Group State Anxiety Before State Anxiety After Trait Anxiety 
Low Anxious 29.48 (6.89) 30.26 (5.92) 34.82 (8.10) 
    
High Anxious 39.07 (8.62) 48.08 (7.50) 48.00 (10.19) 
 
Design. This experiment measured memory accuracy, confidence, response time, and the 
relation between the accuracy-confidence as dependent variables for the two groups (HA and 
LA) but I also examined trials where participants switched responses. All switched responses 
were examined for accuracy, confidence, and response time. 
Procedure and Materials. All materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, the 
exception being that for the anxiety induction I only used the RP as there was not a significant 
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difference in results depending on which of the two inductions was employed in Experiment 1. I 
also did not use the SC recording device as the results had not been significant in Experiment 1.  
 The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except for the addition of an opportunity to 
change one’s memory response, and a re-evaluation of one’s confidence. Participants completed 
the STAI (state only) right before engaging in the memory task and then again after completing 
the entire experiment. I did not use the standard instructions. The first time they completed the 
state scale they were asked to report how they felt at the moment and the second time they were 
instructed to report how they felt during the experiment. Trait anxiety was collected at the same 
time as the second state anxiety and participants were asked to report how they felt in their 
everyday lives. Specifically, after making the initial recognition decision and confidence 
judgment as in Experiment 1, participants were given five seconds to change their response, to 
which they could reply “yes” or “no” using the “y” and “n” keys. Participants were then asked to 
rate their confidence for a second time, whether they had changed their response or not. 
Participants were given 3s to make these responses, the same amount of time as their initial 
recognition decision. 
3.2 Results 
 
Memory Accuracy. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted using d’ memory accuracy as 
the dependent measure, with List (1 and 2) and State Anxiety Group (high anxiety (HA) and low 
anxiety (LA)) as between-participant factors. Time (before switch and after switch) was the 
within participants factor. There was no significant effect of List therefore it was excluded from 
further analysis F (1, 55) = 2.45, MSE = 1.41, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p = 0.12. There was no significant 
effect of Group F (1, 55) = 0.62, MSE = 1.41, ηp
2
 = 0.01, p = 0.44 or Time F (1, 55) = 0.50, MSE 
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= 0.06, ηp
2
 = 0.01, p = 0.48 but there was a significant Group by Time Interaction F (1, 55) = 
5.75, MSE = 0.06, ηp
2
 = 0.09, p = 0.02 (see Figure 1).  
 The interaction was explored using 2 paired t-tests, one for each group. For the LA group, 
there was no significant difference in accuracy before (Time 1) to after having the opportunity to 
switch memory responses (Time 2), t (34) = 1.39, p = 0.17. However, the HA group had a 
trending effect of lower Accuracy after being given the option to change responses t (23) = 1.89, 
p = 0.07 (see Figure 1). The groups started with similar levels of memory accuracy but after 
making switch responses, the HA had worse memory performance than the LA group. Therefore 
the answer-switching manipulation was not beneficial to the HA group in that it did not increase 
memory performance. 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Mean memory accuracy by group with error bars displaying standard error of the 
mean 
Memory Switch Responses. Overall, out of 3449 responses (~60 responses per participant as 
some participants missed button presses), participants changed their answers 128 times. While 
that seems very low (3.71% of responses overall), it is similar to other studies in this area (Welch 
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& Leichner, 1988). Ten participants did not make a change in any of their memory responses (n 
HA = 2, n LA = 8).  The HA group made 47 incorrect switches and 18 correct while the LA 
group made 30 switches to incorrect and 33 to correct. This difference was tested using chi-
square and was found to be significant across Groups (HA and LA), χ2(1, N = 128) = 8.14, p = 
0.004 (see Table 5 for means). Therefore, answer switching did not affect the LA group but was 
a detriment to the HA group meaning that this manipulation was not beneficial to HA 
participants. 
Table 5 
 Number and percentage of participants in each group who increased, decreased, or maintained 
their original memory accuracy level after changing responses (participants who did not make 
any switches were excluded) 
 Group Increased Decreased Maintained 
Low Anxious (n = 27) 12 (44%) 10 (37%) 5 (19%) 
    
High Anxious (n = 22) 6 (27%) 14 (63%) 2 (9%) 
 
Memory Response Times. RTs to make memory decisions were analyzed using two 
independent t-tests, one for the first memory response and a second for the possible switch 
response. The results were analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with Response (response 1 and 
switch response) as the within-participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the between-
participants factor.  There was a main effect of Response F (1, 57) = 171.16, MSE = 63474.62, 
ηp
2
 = 0.75, p < 0.001 such that the initial memory response took longer than the switch response. 
There was no main effect of Group (F = 1) but there was a significant Response x Group 
interaction F (1, 57) = 5.37, MSE = 63474.62, ηp
2
 = 0.09, p = 0.02. 
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I followed up with two independent t-tests, one for each response type (response 1 and 
switch response). In the t-test for the first memory response, there was not a significant effect of 
Group (t <1). The second t-test of RT to make switch response revealed a significant effect of 
Group t (1, 57) = 2.44, p = 0.02 such that the HA took longer to make their decision than the LA 
group. This shows evidence of a processing speed deficit in the HA group. See Table 6 for 
means and standard deviations. Therefore, in this experiment, the finding that the HA group 
takes longer to make post-memorial decisions than the LA group has been upheld as the option 
to switch is, similar to the confidence decisions in the previous experiment, an opportunity for 
the participant to critically evaluate their performance. 
Table 6 
 Median (and Standard Deviation in parentheses) response times (in milliseconds) for memory 
decisions in HA and LA Participants 
 Group 
RT for Hits Before 
Change 
RT for Hits After 
Change 
Low Anxious 1340 (310) 613 (233) 
   
High Anxious 1285 (228) 777 (280) 
 
Response Time Switch Responses. To determine whether participants took longer when 
switching an answer, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with RT as the dependent measure 
and Group (HA and LA) as the between participants factor and Response Type (change or no 
change) as the within-participants factor. There was a significant effect of Response Type, F (1, 
47) = 7.23, MSE = 65597.88, ηp
2
 = 0.13, p = 0.01, such that participants took longer to make a 
response when they changed their answer compared to when it remained the same. There was not 
a main effect of Group, F (1, 47) = 1.86, MSE = 129504.03, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p = 0.18, or an 
interaction (F < 1).  
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Confidence. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with confidence as the dependant 
measure and Group (HA and LA) as the between participants factor. Time (before switch and 
after switch) and Accuracy (correct and incorrect) were the within participants factors.  There 
was a main effect of Time, F (1, 57) = 13.81, MSE = 0.09, ηp
2
 = 0.20, p < 0.001, such that 
participants were more confident after than before they were asked if they wanted to modify their 
responses. There was also a main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 57) = 161.82, MSE = 0.32, ηp
2
 = 0.74, 
p < 0.001, such that correct responses were rated higher in confidence than incorrect responses. 
There was also a Time x Accuracy interaction, F (1, 57) = 2.45, MSE = 0.08, ηp
2
 = 0.12, p = 
0.007. The effect of Group and all other interactions were not significant (all Fs < 1) (see Figure 
2). 
 To explore the source of the Time x Accuracy interaction 2 follow-up mixed ANOVAs 
were conducted, one for each Accuracy (correct and incorrect).  For Correct responses, there was 
a main effect of Time, F (1, 57) = 6.26, MSE = 0.01, ηp
2
 = 0.10, p = 0.02. For Incorrect 
responses, the effect size of Time was significant and larger, F (1, 57) = 11.25, MSE = 0.15, ηp
2
 
= 0.17, p = 0.001, than for correct responses (see Figure 2), accounting for the interaction. There 
was no significant effect of Group nor an interaction with Time (all Fs < 1).  Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, the HA was not found to be less confident than the LA group, suggesting that the 
ability to switch answers increased confidence in HA participants. However, while increasing 
confidence was a goal of this manipulation, it was not accompanied by an increase in memory 
accuracy. 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2. Mean reported confidence before and after change response by item accuracy; error 
bars show standard error of the mean 
Confidence Switch Responses. The 128 switch responses were analyzed separately with a 
mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA with Time (before switch and after switch) as the within and Group (HA 
and LA) as the between participants factor. There was a main effect of Time, F (1, 126) = 27.34, 
MSE = 1.56, ηp
2
 = 0.18, p < 0.001, such that confidence increased after switching a response. 
There was a trending Time X Group interaction F (1, 126) = 3.18, MSE = 1.56, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 
0.08 and no main effect of Group, F (1, 126) = 2.48, MSE = 4.57, ηp
2
 = 0.02, p = 0.12. 
Confidence Response Times. RTs to make Confidence ratings were analyzed in the same 
manner as confidence scores: a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted with confidence as the 
dependent measure and Group (HA and LA) as the between-participants factor. Time (before 
switch and after switch) and Accuracy (correct and incorrect) were the within-participants 
factors. There was a main effect of Time, F (1, 57) = 11.92, MSE = 94024.52, ηp
2
 = 0.17, p = 
0.001, with participants making confidence judgments more quickly after being given the option 
to switch responses. There was also a main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 57) = 52.24, MSE = 
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28054.69, ηp
2
 = 0.48, p < 0.001, such that participants were quicker to respond when correct. 
There was also a Time x Accuracy interaction, F (1, 57) = 14.07, MSE = 25518.14, ηp
2
 = 0.20, p 
< 0.001 (see Figure 4). There was no significant effect of Group, F (1, 57) = 1.51, MSE = 
210790.17, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 0.22, and all other interactions were not significant (Fs < 1) (see 
Figure 3). 
 The interaction between Time and Accuracy was explored in 2 follow-up ANOVAs, one 
for each Accuracy. For Correct responses, the effect of Time was non-significant, F (1, 57) = 
2.85, MSE = 36988.34, ηp
2
 = 0.05, p = 0.10. There was no significant effect of Group, F (1, 57) = 
2.25, MSE = 110275.45, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p = 0.14 and the interaction was also not significant (F < 1). 
For Incorrect responses, there was a main effect of Time, F (1, 57) = 16.64, MSE = 82554.32, ηp
2
 
= 0.23, p < 0.001, with participants responding more quickly after the opportunity to switch. 
There was no main effect of Group or interaction (Fs < 1). Therefore, in the current experiment, 
a processing speed deficit was not found for confidence but rather for switch responses in the HA 
group. As deciding to switch responses is also a post-memorial decision this evidence does not 
conflict with the Experiment 1. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3. Mean confidence response time in milliseconds before and after making the change 
response by accuracy; error bars show standard error of the mean 
Confidence Response Time for Switch Responses. To determine whether participants took 
longer to report confidence when switching an answer, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
with RT as the dependent measure and Group (HA and LA) as the between participants factor 
and Response Type (change or no change) as the within participants factor. There was a 
significant effect of Response Type, F (1, 47) = 25.99, MSE = 109761.08, ηp
2
 = 0.36, p < 0.0001, 
such that participants took longer to make a confidence response when they changed their answer 
compared to when it remained the same. There was not a main effect of Group, F (1, 47) = 1.57, 
MSE = 187342.18, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 0.22, or an interaction (F < 1). Therefore, in this experiment, 
the only time that HA participants took longer than their LA peers was when making the decision 
to switch their answer or not. Neither confidence judgment was slower. 
Confidence-Accuracy Relation. The accuracy-confidence relation was examined by calculating 
Gamma coefficients for each individual participant. I compared Gamma using a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with Group (HA and LA) as the between-participants factor and Time (before switch and after 
switch) as the within-participants factor. There was a main effect of Time, F (1, 57) = 8.15, MSE 
= 0.17, ηp
2
 = 0.13, p = 0.006, such that participants’ resolution became lower after the change. 
This means that participants’ confidence became a poorer predictor of their accuracy over time. 
There was no significant effect of Group nor an interaction (Fs < 1). See Table 7 for means and 
standard deviations. Therefore, neither group was more realistic in their confidence ratings, 
though with repeated questioning, confidence became a poorer indicator of accuracy.  This 
means that once again, it was not found that HA participants more realistically appraise their 
performance. 
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Table 7 
 Mean (and standard deviation in parentheses) Gamma coefficients in HA and LA Participants 
 Group Gamma Before Change Gamma After Change 
Low Anxious 0.56 (0.28) 0.42 (0.38) 
   
High Anxious 0.59 (0.21) 0.48 (0.22) 
 
3.3 Discussion 
 
 In the current experiment I examined the memory accuracy, response time, and 
confidence of HA and LA participants when they were able to modify responses. I examined 
whether having the opportunity to modify responses would increase memory accuracy or 
confidence in the HA group as it was possible that they were re-evaluating their responses during 
confidence rating in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, I found reduced memory accuracy in the 
HA compared to the LA group, though this time it was only after they modified their responses. I 
also found that the post-decision response took longer to make in the HA group, though in this 
experiment (unlike in Exp. 1) it was the switch response rather than confidence judgments that 
showed the Group effect on slowing. In the current experiment, I found that the HA was just as 
confident as the LA group which is different from others’ findings (Nolan & Markham, 1998; 
Dobson & Markham, 2001; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Valentine & Mesout 2009) as well as from 
my findings from Experiment 1. However, it could be that knowing they would have the 
opportunity to switch responses helped the HA group to feel more confident in their responses. 
 As for the switched responses themselves, I found that the HA group made more switches 
overall and that they were more often wrong when they switched. This is in line with the findings 
of Green (1981), who also reported higher rates of switching and lower test scores in a HA 
group. For the LA participants, switching was not beneficial to them as a group but left the 
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average score unchanged. As for individual participants, outcomes were split between those who 
increased, decreased, and maintained their original scores. Usually an improvement in scores is 
reported in the literature (Welch & Leichner, 1988; Geiger, 1991; Kruger et al., 2005), though 
this may be related to how accuracy was scored. In multi-alternative choice examinations, which 
were used in all the experiments that found a facilitation of response switching, it was possible to 
have a wrong to wrong switch that did not change accuracy. 
 As for memory confidence, I found that confidence increased by the second response, 
regardless of whether participants changed their responses. The reason that I did not observe the 
drop in confidence after switching normally found in other experiments that examined multiple 
choice tests is most likely because I did not use the multi-alternative choice format (Geiger, 
1991; Kruger et al., 2005). As cited by Welch and Leichner (1988), students are often advised 
orally or even in written instructions that they should “go with their first impression” in multiple 
choice examinations. Therefore researchers have found that participants become less confident 
when they switch answers on a multiple choice test (Geiger, 1991; Kruger et al., 2005). 
Participants may not have extended this idea to my task as they only were able to make two 
responses: yes and no. I did find support though, for the evidence provided by Shaw and 
McClure (1996) that repeated questioning can lead to higher confidence over time without 
influencing accuracy. In their experiment, memory tests were administered over several weeks or 
several days and confidence was shown to increase over the course of five examinations. In the 
current experiment, I was able to show a rapid increase of confidence, as participants reported 
higher confidence the second time, regardless of whether they had made a switch response. The 
act of confirming their decision increased confidence in both groups. 
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  I did not uncover group differences in resolution of the accuracy-confidence relation. 
Yet, there was an increased level of confidence without accuracy increases after the option to 
switch responses, which led to lower overall gamma correlations. This result is similar to that of 
Shaw and McClure (1996), who also observed an increase of confidence but not memory 
accuracy in their experiment resulting in a loss of statistical correlation between accuracy and 
confidence. In my experiment, the accuracy-confidence relation was maintained though it did 
decrease significantly from before to after the change response. It is possible that if I had 
provided additional chances to confirm or change response the data would have more closely 
resembled those of Shaw and McClure (1996). 
 As in Experiment 1, I did not find that the HA took longer to make memory decisions 
than the LA group, despite the decrease in task effectiveness found in the HA group. This 
suggests that an amendment is needed to PET such that anxious participants can defer worry 
until after a recognition decision has been made. In my next experiment, I was interested in 
exploring whether these results would hold even without the presence of an anxiety 
manipulation. 
  
39 
 
4. Experiment 3: Role of encoding duration (Delleman & Fernandes, under revision). 
In the final experiment of my master’s thesis, I explored the effects of anxiety without having 
an induction manipulation. I also added a manipulation of encoding duration in hopes that 
increased time to memorize items would ameliorate the memory accuracy and confidence in HA 
individuals. In addition, I again explored RTs and the accuracy-confidence relation between HA 
and LA participants. 
Encoding duration has been known to influence both memory accuracy and confidence as 
well as the relation between them. It is known that longer encoding time increases memory 
accuracy for studied words (Craik & Rabinowitz, 1985; Eisdorfer et al., 1963; Grenfell-Essam et 
al., 2013; Smith and Kimball, 2012) and that memory confidence increases as well (, 
Deffenbacher, 1980; Memon et al., 2003). The relation between accuracy and confidence, 
however, is less established. Bothwell and colleagues (1987) found in their meta-analysis that 
longer exposure to faces resulted in better predictability of accuracy from confidence judgments. 
Research by Memon and colleagues (2003), however, showed that the accuracy-confidence 
relation may be influenced negatively by increased encoding time. They manipulated exposure 
time during a simulated crime in which a culprit’s face was shown either for 12s or 45s. While 
overall accuracy was greatly improved in the longer exposure condition, participants who made 
inaccurate identifications were just as confident as those who made accurate ones. In the short 
exposure condition, there was a significant difference in confidence levels based on accuracy. 
The authors suggested that longer exposure times unrealistically inflated witness confidence 
rather than making participants more realistic in their confidence ratings.  
In the current experiment, I was interested in determining the effect of encoding time on 
the accuracy-confidence relation on long-term memory, as well as determining if this would be 
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different in HA and LA participants. Previous research has found that time limits are particularly 
anxiety-provoking in those with test anxiety (Mattarella-Micke et al. 2011). I hypothesized that 
longer encoding times might specifically help the HA group become more confident in their 
responses, bringing their overall confidence closer to that of the LA group. To test the effect of 
encoding time in the current experiment I presented words for either 750 ms or 4000 ms. These 
encoding durations were chosen because previous research in memory and perception estimate 
that 1000 ms is sufficient time to encode a verbatim memory, while shorter durations lead to 
more gist-based memories (Smith & Magee, 1980). Participants were subsequently asked to 
make a recognition decision about each word and to rate their confidence in their responses. I, in 
accordance with the work of Bothwell and colleagues (1987), hypothesized that the longer 
relative to shorter encoding time would lead to superior memory accuracy and higher confidence 
in correct responses as well as higher resolution in the accuracy-confidence relation. 
In the current experiment, anxiety was not manipulated in an effort to explore the role of 
trait anxiety rather than reaction to an anxiety induction. In addition, there is a chance that 
anxiety manipulations may have a motivating effect especially on the LA group (Nolan & 
Markham, 1998). I assessed anxiety using the State–Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic 
Anxiety (STICSA; Ree, MacLeod, French, & Locke, 2000), which is designed to assess 
cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety as they pertain to one’s mood in the moment (state) 
and in general (trait). I used this scale because it has been shown that the resulting scores are less 
confounded with depression and therefore thought to be a purer measure of anxiety (Gr  s et al., 
2007). I conducted a median split of the sample to create HA and LA groups instead of using a 
normative score for this experiment because the STICSA ( Gr  s et al., 2007) does not have the 
same wealth of normative data as the STAI (Speilberger et al., 1983). I used trait anxiety rather 
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than state anxiety because without a direct manipulation of anxiety I expected state anxiety to be 
quite low and therefore have small variance in scores between participants. I compared HA and 
LA groups on memory performance, confidence ratings, and the accuracy-confidence relation. I 
predicted that those with HA would have lower confidence overall compared to the LA group. I 
also predicted that encoding time would enhance accuracy and confidence in both groups. I was 
interested in determining whether a longer encoding duration would be more beneficial for HA 
than LA participants, and would help them to become more confident in their responses, bringing 
their overall confidence closer to that of the LA group. 
 
4.1 Method 
Participants. There were 137 undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo who took 
part in the experiment. Twenty participants were excluded: 2 for computer errors that 
inadvertently terminated the experiment, 11 for having response times on memory decisions 3 
SD above or below the mean, and 7 because their memory accuracy as indexed by d’ was zero or 
below in the 4000ms encoding duration memory test, indicating that they were not following 
instructions or paying sufficient attention to the task. None of the participants had ever been 
diagnosed, been treated for, or currently had depression or clinical anxiety disorders. 
The remaining 117 participants were separated into HA and LA groups based on a 
median split of trait anxiety scores from STICSA. The STICSA is a 21-item questionnaire in 
which participants rate, on a 4-point Likert scale, the frequency of somatic and cognitive 
components of anxiety. Test instructions are designed to assess ‘state anxiety’ by asking 
participants to respond based on how they felt during the experiment and to assess ‘trait anxiety’ 
by asking participants to respond based on frequency of occurrence of each symptom in their 
everyday lives. Participants were divided into HA and LA groups based on a median split of the 
42 
 
trait anxiety score. Fifty-seven participants scored 32 and above making up the HA group (33 
male, Age = 20.02, sd = 1.72, Years of Education = 14.48, sd = 1.50). Fifty-nine participants 
scored 31 and lower, making up the LA Group (29 male, Age = 20.24, sd = 1.72, Years of 
Education = 14.69, sd = 1.29). Neither age nor years of education differed significantly across 
groups (t (115) = 0.87, p = 0.39, t (115) = 0.47, p = 0.64).  
Both state and trait anxiety scores differed significantly across groups. State t (115 = 
6.78, p < 0.001 and trait anxiety t (115) = 15.89, p < 0.001 were higher in the HA than LA group 
(for means and standard deviations, see Table 8). The HA group reported higher trait anxiety 
than that reported in a normative study of control participants from Grös and colleagues (2007), 
but lower than that reported by clinical samples within that study.  State and trait anxiety scores, 
collapsed across groups, were positively correlated, r (115) = 0.60, p < 0.001. Scores were 
positively correlated in the LA group (r (58) = 0.50, p < 0.001), and trended towards significance 
in the HA group, r (57) = 0.23, p = 0.08. This difference is most likely due to the HA group 
reporting relatively low rates of state anxiety but high trait anxiety whereas the LA group 
reported low anxiety on both measures. 
Table 8 
 Mean (and standard deviation) state and trait anxiety scores for the HA and LA groups 
Group State Anxiety  Trait Anxiety 
Low Anxious 26.46 (5.19) 25.68 (3.17) 
   
High Anxious 34.60 (7.60) 40.78 (6.56) 
   
 
Design and Materials. I compared memory accuracy, confidence, as well as the accuracy-
confidence resolution in the two groups. This was both a within- (long vs. short encoding 
duration) and between- (HA vs. LA) participant design. 
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Memory task materials. The same word lists from Experiment 1 and 2 were used in this 
experiment. For the purposes of this experiment, each list was divided randomly into 2 lists, one 
for each encoding block of 750 or 4000 ms. 
Procedure. A computer task was designed using E-prime (v.2.2 software, Psychology Software 
Tools Inc., Pittsburg, PA) to control stimulus presentation on a 17” computer monitor and 
response recording for the memory task. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  
Encoding was separated into two blocks of 15 words which were both presented before 
the recognition test. Words were presented one at a time, for either a short (750 ms) or long 
(4000 ms) duration depending on the block, counterbalanced across participants. Prior to each 
block, participants were instructed that the list would be presented either quickly or slowly and 
were told to remember all of the words as best they could. After completing both blocks of 
encoding, they were asked to count backwards by threes from 200 for 30 s, during which time 
the computer screen was blank, to reduce recency effects. 
Following encoding of words from both encoding durations, the recognition phase began. 
Participants completed two different 30-item recognition test blocks, one for each encoding 
block, with order counterbalanced across participants. Participants were informed prior to each 
test block that they would be presented with a list of words, half of which came from the short 
(or long) encoding block, and half of which were brand new, unstudied, words. Each recognition 
block contained 15 ‘old’ words and 15 lures. It was emphasized to participants that the 
recognition blocks were not mixed (e.g., no words would appear from the ‘short duration’ list 
during the ‘long duration’ recognition block). In each recognition block, words were presented 
sequentially on the screen for 6000 ms followed by a fixation cross for 500 ms. During 
presentation of each word, participants were asked to make an ‘old’ or ‘new’ recognition 
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decision by pressing the ‘n’ or ‘m’ key respectively, on a QWERTY keyboard. Following that 
decision, they made a rating indicating their confidence in their decision on a 6-point scale using 
the number keys on the top row of the keyboard: 1-2 indicating not very confident, 3-4 indicating 
moderately confident, and 5-6 indicating very confident.  
After recognition was completed, participants were asked to complete the STICSA. Prior 
to commencing the experimental phase, participants completed an encoding phase consisting of a 
5-word list at 2000 ms duration followed by a practice 10-word recognition memory test with the 
same presentation rate as the experimental test, consisting of the 5 studied words and 5 lures, to 
familiarize participants with stimulus presentation and timing. 
4.2 Results 
 
Memory
1
. Memory accuracy was computed using d’ (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), which was 
calculated as z hits minus z false alarms, and analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with Duration 
(750 ms and 4000 ms) as the within-participant factor and Group (HA and LA), as well as Order 
of experimental conditions (1-8), as between-participant factors.  As expected, there was a main 
effect of Duration, F (1, 113) = 53.13, MSE = 0.49, ηp
2
 = 0.32, p < 0.001, with all participants 
achieving higher d’ scores for words presented in the long compared to short duration block at 
encoding. The main effect of Group was significant, F (1, 113) = 3.74, MSE = 0.80, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p 
= 0.03, with the LA group having higher d’ scores than the HA group. All interactions and other 
effects were not significant. As Order was not significant, it was not included in further analysis. 
Means and standard deviations for both groups are presented in Table 9. In the current 
                                                          
1 Regardless of whether groups were formed using a median split based on trait or state scores from 
STICSA, the direction of results was the same. 
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experiment therefore, I again replicated previous results of reduced memory performance in the 
HA compared to the LA group despite the lack of anxiety-induction.
 
Table 9 
Mean recognition memory performance measured as d’ (with standard deviations in 
parentheses) following short and long encoding durations in HA and LA Groups 
   Group          Duration 750 ms Duration 4000 ms 
Low Anxious  1.60 (0.77) 2.23 (0.94) 
High Anxious 1.30 (0.65) 2.01 (0.83) 
 
Memory Response Times. Memory RTs were analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with Duration 
(750 ms and 4000 ms) as the within-participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the between-
participants factor.  There was a main effect of Duration, F (1, 115) = 6.07, MSE = 25589.97, ηp
2
 
= 0.05, p = 0.02, such that participants took longer to respond for the words presented for 750 ms 
than those presented for 4000 ms. There was no main effect of Group, F (1, 115) = 1.11, MSE = 
110116.72, ηp
2
 = 0.01, p = 0.30, or interaction, F (1, 115) = 1.78, MSE = 25589.97, ηp
2
 = 0.02, p 
= 0.18. Therefore, I have shown for the third time that there is not a processing speed deficit in 
recognition decisions in the HA group. 
Confidence. Confidence was analyzed in a mixed ANOVA with Duration (750 ms and 4000 ms) 
and Accuracy (correct and incorrect) as the within-participant factors and Group (HA and LA) as 
the between-participant factor.  Participants who did not have any incorrect responses (i.e., no 
false alarms or misses; n = 8, 4 HA and 4 LA) were excluded from this analysis. Overall, the LA 
group made 669 incorrect (or 19%) and the HA group made 773 incorrect (or 23%) responses. 
There was a main effect of Duration, F (1, 103) = 13.30, MSE = 0.51, ηp
2
 = 0.12, p < 0.001, with 
words encoded in the longer duration block having higher reported confidence. There was also a 
main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 103) = 105.20, MSE = 0.58, ηp
2
 = 0.51, p < 0.001, with 
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participants reporting higher confidence for correct answers. The main effect of Group was non-
significant (F < 1). There was a significant Accuracy x Group interaction, F (1, 103) = 4.55, 
MSE = 0.58, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p = 0.04, and a significant Accuracy x Duration interaction, F (1, 103) = 
27.19, MSE = 0.35, ηp
2
 = 0.21, p < 0.001 (see Figure 4). The Group X Duration and the three-
way interaction were non-significant (F < 1).  
Figure 4 
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Figure 4. Top panel shows mean confidence reported with standard error bars for accuracy by 
group. Bottom panel shows mean confidence reported with standard error bars for accuracy by 
encoding duration. 
The significant 2-way interactions were explored by conducting 2 additional mixed 
ANOVAs, one for Accurate and one for Inaccurate responses with Duration (within) and Group 
(between) as factors. For Inaccurate responses, there were no main effects or interactions (all Fs 
< 1). For Accurate responses, the main effect of Duration was significant, F (1, 115) = 41.29, 
MSE = 0.51, ηp
2
 = 0.27, p < 0.001, with participants reporting higher confidence in their 
responses to words from the longer encoding duration. There was also a significant main effect 
of Group, F (1, 115) = 5.26, MSE = 1.01, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p = 0.02, with the HA reporting 
significantly lower confidence in correct responses compared to the LA group. The Group X 
Duration interaction was non-significant, F (1, 115) = 1.79, MSE = 0.52, ηp
2
 = 0.02, p = 0.18. In 
this experiment, HA again report lower confidence than the LA participants despite the lack of 
an anxiety-induction. This suggests that the decreased confidence found in the literature and in 
this series of experiments may be a semi-permanent state for HA individuals. 
Confidence Response Times. Confidence was analyzed in a mixed ANOVA with Duration (750 
ms and 4000 ms) and Accuracy (correct and incorrect) as the within-participant factors and 
Group (HA and LA) as the between-participant factor.  As with confidence, participants who did 
not have any incorrect responses were excluded from this analysis. There was a main effect of 
Duration, F (1, 103) = 9.81, MSE = 44782.39, ηp
2
 = 0.09, p = 0.002, such that participants took 
longer to respond when rating confidence for 4000 ms than 750 ms words. There was also a main 
effect of Accuracy, F (1, 103) = 34.48, MSE = 43630.01, ηp
2
 = 0.25, p < 0.001, such that 
participants were faster to respond when correct than incorrect. The effect of Group approached 
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significance, F (1, 103) = 2.62, MSE = 288052.31, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 0.109, with the HA responding 
more slowly than the LA group. There was also a Duration x Accuracy interaction, F (1, 103) = 
5.32, MSE = 24028.01, ηp
2
 = 0.05, p = 0.02 (see Figure 5). No other interactions were significant 
(Fs < 1). 
 The significant 2-way interactions were explored by conducting 2 additional mixed 
ANOVAs, one for Accurate and one for Inaccurate responses with Duration (within) and Group 
(between) as factors. For Accurate responses, there was no longer a main effect of Duration (F < 
1) or Group, F (1, 115) = 2.15, MSE = 336132.70, ηp
2
 = 0.02, p = 0.15, and the interaction was 
also non-significant (F < 1). For Inaccurate responses, there effect of Duration remained, F (1, 
103) = 9.50, MSE = 54776.86, ηp
2
 = 0.08, p = 0.003, in the same direction as before and there 
was also a trending effect of Group, F (1, 103) = 3.62, MSE = 177163.84, ηp
2
 = 0.03, p = 0.060, 
such that the HA was responding more slowly than the LA group. This finding again confirms 
what was found in Experiments 1 and 2, that the HA group takes more time than the LA group to 
make post-memorial decisions but not the initial recognition judgment. 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 5. Top panel shows mean confidence response times with standard error bars for 
accurate responses by group. Bottom panel shows mean confidence response times with 
standard error bars for inaccurate responses by group. 
Accuracy-Confidence Resolution. To examine the relation between accuracy and confidence, I 
calculated Goodman-Kruskal (1954) Gamma coefficients for each person at each of the two 
durations. The resulting Gamma correlations were analyzed using a mixed ANOVA with 
Duration (750 ms and 4000 ms) as the within-participants factor and Group (HA and LA) as the 
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between-participants factor. There was a main effect of Duration, F (1, 115) = 16.21, MSE = 
0.08, ηp
2
 = 0.12, p < 0.001, with higher Gamma correlations for the longer encoding duration 
block. There was also a significant effect of Group, F (1, 115) = 5.12, MSE = 0.21, ηp
2
 = 0.04, p 
= 0.04, such that the LA group had higher Gamma correlations than the HA group. The Group x 
Duration interaction was non-significant, F (1, 115) = 1.07, MSE = 0.08, ηp
2
 = 0.01, p = 0.30. 
Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 10. Therefore, in this experiment a difference 
in resolution was found between the HA and LA groups, however, the HA group was not found 
to be more realistic, instead under-confidence led to a poorer predictive association between 
confidence and memory accuracy. 
Table 10 
Mean Gamma coefficients (with standard deviations in parentheses) following short and long 
encoding durations in HA and LA Groups  
 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
I examined memory accuracy and confidence, as well as the relation between these 
measures, for words presented at two different encoding durations in participants with high and 
low self-reported levels of anxiety. I aimed to determine whether HA individuals had more or 
less realistic appraisals of confidence than LA participants and to explore whether a longer 
encoding duration would increase confidence in the HA group. While encoding duration did not 
lead to a differential benefit in HA and LA participants, I demonstrated the expected finding that 
longer encoding time improves memory and increases confidence. I also showed that differences 
in self-reported anxiety led to significant deficits in memory accuracy, consistent with some 
   Group          Duration 750ms Duration 4000ms 
Low Anxious      0.46 (0.34) 0.57 (0.44) 
High Anxious      0.29 (0.35) 0.47 (0.38) 
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studies (Cheie & Visu-Petra, 2012; Dodson & Markham, 2001; Glover & Cravens, 1974; 
Salthouse, 2012; Valentine & Mesout, 2009) and Experiment 1 and 2. In line with other research, 
my HA group showed lower confidence judgments than those in the LA group (Nolan & 
Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). I additionally showed 
that longer encoding duration improves the accuracy-confidence resolution, suggesting that 
longer encoding times lead to a more realistic appraisal of confidence instead of over-confidence 
as suggested by Memon and colleagues (2003) since overconfidence would have led to less 
positive accuracy-confidence Gamma correlations.  
 I did not find that encoding duration led to any differential effects for HA and LA 
participants, although I did replicate past findings of higher memory accuracy with longer 
encoding duration (Craik & Rabinowitz, 1985; Eisdorfer et al., 1963; Grenfell-Essam et al., 
2013; Smith & Kimball, 2012). I also supported Bothwell and colleagues’ (1987) assertion that 
longer encoding durations results in a higher accuracy-confidence resolution. I acknowledge, 
however, that the low number of incorrect trials in my study may limit the strength of my 
conclusion. Yet, the ratio of difference between correct and incorrect trails that went into the 
Gamma correlation is similar to that reported in other studies using this statistic (Bornstien & 
Zickafoose, 1999, Brewer & Sampaio, 2006). My findings run counter to Memon and 
colleagues’ (2003) findings that longer encoding leads to overconfidence in false alarms. Memon 
and colleagues (2003) used much longer encoding durations, of 12 s and 45 s, than in my 
experiment, which may also be the reason for the disparity in results as the researchers argued 
that the participants felt that after such a long encoding duration they “ought” to know the 
answer.  Their experiment also had a simultaneous line-up presentation during recognition, and it 
has been demonstrated previously (Deffenbacher, 1980) that forced choice tasks of this nature 
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result in higher confidence judgments overall, compared to single response presentation, as was 
used in my experiment. 
The accuracy-confidence relation in this experiment was analyzed using Gamma 
correlations and it was shown that high levels of self-reported anxiety reduced the accuracy-
confidence correlation, regardless of encoding duration. Gamma correlations are driven by the 
difference in participant’s confidence between correct and incorrect responses. The HA group 
had low levels of confidence specifically for correct responses which meant that the difference 
between correct and incorrect responses was smaller than in the LA group, accounting for the 
low correlation between accuracy and confidence in the HA group. My findings support the 
suggestion by Ridley and Clifford (2006) that HA participants have unrealistically low reports of 
confidence in their accurate responses. I was unable to determine whether this effect was driven 
by state or trait anxiety as both were significantly higher in the HA group and they were also 
correlated. 
 My results show that increasing encoding time is beneficial to memory accuracy, 
confidence, and the relation between them. Moreover, I demonstrated that HA have poorer 
accuracy-confidence resolution than LA individuals. My results suggest that anxious individuals 
have less realistic confidence ratings than their low-anxious peers, and increasing encoding 
duration did not alleviate this deficit.  
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5. General Discussion 
 Across three experiments, I examined how individual differences in anxiety in a non-
clinical population influenced memory, confidence, and the relation between them. It was 
consistently found that the anxious group had poorer memory, lower confidence and/or greater 
hesitation when evaluating memory decisions. Experiments 1 and 3 found both of these while in 
Experiment 2 confidence was not different between anxious and low-anxious participants. In 
addition, I did not find any evidence that anxious participants are more realistic in their 
assessments of confidence; instead, the anxious group was either equal to the low-anxious group 
or less realistic. Two manipulations were introduced in an attempt to increase confidence and 
accuracy in the anxious group: the ability to modify responses and longer encoding durations. 
Longer encoding time did not differentially improve the anxious group while the ability to 
modify responses increased confidence but actually decreased accuracy. Overall, this series of 
experiments shows that even non-clinical levels of anxiety can impair memory performance even 
without any overt manipulation or induction of anxiety.  
 Anxiety and Memory 
 
Not all studies have found that high levels of anxiety reduce memory, especially when 
anxiety is induced experimentally. One of the studies that did not find an effect of anxiety on 
memory (Taylor, 1958) used ego threat (that is telling participants that they are performing 
worse than others) as an anxiety manipulation. Given that persons with high anxiety have been 
found to be especially sensitive to negative appraisal (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), they may have 
increased task effort to avoid additional negative evaluation, thereby inadvertently enhancing 
memory performance. Similarly, Nolan and Markham (1998) induced anxiety by showing 
participants video recordings of their responses while they were recalling details of a crime, and 
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informed participants that their responses would be watched by raters afterwards. It is resonable 
to assume that in that situation anxious participants would have again been aware of possible 
negative evaluation by others and increased task effort to avoid embarrassment, again enhancing 
memory in this group. 
For this reason, I tested memory accuracy in HA and LA participants both when anxiety 
was induced and when it was not. When inducing anxiety in Experiment 1 and 2, I did not use 
ego threat, which could increase on-task effort, but instead introduced an unrelated but anxiety-
provoking task. In the second experiment, I did not induce anxiety at all, though there is some 
concern that the memory test and experimental setting would induce some anxiety on its own, 
and memory deficits in the HA group still emerged. These effects were more subtle and I 
required a much larger sample size than in Experiments 1 and 2. By not including a direct 
manipulation of anxiety in Experiment 3, I was able to suggest that there are individual 
differences that extend beyond particularly anxiety-provoking settings. 
Processing Efficiency Theory and Long-term Memory 
 
 I have shown consistently throughout these three experiments that processing efficiency 
on a word recognition task, as indexed by RT, was not affected by anxiety. Instead, I saw a 
decrease in effectiveness, memory accuracy, without corresponding RT differences. Differences 
in RTs emerged in every experiment but they were all in post-decision processes, rating 
confidence or deciding whether to change a response. This suggests that, in a design where a 
response can be evaluated after it is made, highly anxious individuals are able to defer task- 
performance worry until that time. Clearly, in all experiments, HA participants were able to 
identify or reject a word as quickly as their LA peers. This finding suggests an amendment to 
processing efficiency theory (PET) such that worry slows only post-decisional processes and not 
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recognition decisions themselves. Studies in the past that examined anxiety, confidence, and 
memory did not report RTs (Dodson & Marksham, 2001; Nolan & Markham, 1998; Ridley & 
Clifford, 2006) making it difficult to compare my findings to others. 
 Interestingly, and in line with my findings, a study in clinical participants by MacDonald 
and colleagues (1997) also failed to find support for PET on a long-term memory test. The 
experiment compared patients with checking subtype obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 
other subtypes of OCD, and healthy controls. Participants were asked to remember a list of 
words and response times and confidence were also recorded. There was a marginal difference in 
RTs between the checking group and the other two collapsed but no other contrasts were 
significant. Unfortunately, confidence response times were not reported. The researchers argued 
that the results may not have been significant because participants were given unlimited time to 
respond and were also not given instructions about responding as quickly as possible. In my 
experiments both of those elements were present and an RT difference was still not observed. In 
addition, the non-checker OCD group had an average RT that was virtually identical to the 
controls despite having very high levels of state anxiety. This provides converging evidence from 
a clinical sample that in long-term memory task, processing efficiency is not affected before 
effectiveness. 
Memory Confidence and Anxiety 
 
 I replicated past findings of reduced memory confidence in Experiments 1 and 3 but not 
in Experiment 2, where HA and LA participants had similar levels of confidence. Lower 
confidence has been found in most examinations of sub-clinical anxious participants (Nolan & 
Markham, 1998; Ridley & Clifford, 2006; Valentine & Mesout, 2009), yet one examination of 
clinical participants that also included a sub-clinical anxious group found that confidence in that 
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group did not differ from controls (Tuna et al., 2005). As the answer-switching paradigm from 
Experiment 2 had not been used in previous studies and as the effect of anxiety on confidence 
has been reasonably consistent in the literature, my results suggest that knowing there would be 
an opportunity to switch answers increased the confidence of the HA group. In addition, there 
was not a large difference in overall confidence between experiments (average overall 
confidence was consistently about 5.00 on a 1-6 point scale). 
 Experiment 3 also showed that the lack of confidence in HA individuals, reported in the 
literature, is present even in the absence of a specific anxiety induction. This suggests that 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety may experience low levels of confidence often, 
especially when engaged in tasks that test their memories. This effect was alleviated when 
participants were given time to change their responses but not when encoding time was 
lengthened. More investigation would be required to determine whether this apparently persistent 
lack of confidence interferes with everyday functioning and whether there would be performance 
improvements in this population if their confidence deficits were ameliorated. 
The Accuracy and Confidence Relation 
 
 Across the 3 experiments, I only discovered a difference in the accuracy-confidence 
relation once, when I did not directly induce anxiety. When anxiety was induced, highly anxious 
participants had similar resolution to the low anxiety group. My findings overall suggest that 
Ridley and Clifford (2004) were correct in their assertion that highly anxious participants are less 
realistic than their low-anxious peers. Despite low-anxious participants often being found to be 
overconfident (Adams & Adams, 1960; Chua et al., 2012; Fichhoff et al., 1977), the HA group 
has been shown to be under-confident, though not always to a level that affects their accuracy-
confidence relation. 
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Since there was not an experiment in the sub-clinical literature that performed similar 
analysis to mine, I examined the clinical literature. An experiment that examined both OCD 
patient checkers and sub-clinical checkers on memory for words found that OCD patients had 
gamma correlations that were not significantly different from zero (Tuna et al., 2005). The sub-
clinical participants were not different from the control group and both scored within the normal 
range found in similar experiments. This experiment included both a paired-recall test and a 
forced-choice recognition test. However, the control sample had higher levels of state and trait 
anxiety than my sample since inclusion in that group was dependent on checking symptoms and 
not anxiety. There was also no anxiety induction included in this experiment. Despite above 
average levels of anxiety in the sub-clinical group in this experiment, no memory deficits and no 
deficit in confidence were found relative to the controls. Again, this may be because of the 
grouping criteria. This experiment again provides converging evidence with mine as the most 
highly anxious group did not have a reliable accuracy-confidence relation.  
Limitations and Conclusions 
 
 There are several limitations to this thesis that will be discussed here. Firstly, the 
distinction between anxious and low-anxious participants was varied across experiments as I 
used two different standardized tests, the STAI and the STICSA. STICSA was used in 
Experiment 3 because it has been reported to be less confounded with depression and has also 
been found to be well correlated with STAI results (Grös et al., 2007). I also separated the groups 
in Experiments 1 and 2 by the normative average on STAI, but in Experiment 3 performed a 
median split. The reason for this difference was twofold. Firstly the STICSA does not have the a 
wealth of normative data that the STAI does so I was not as certain of the average level of 
anxiety found in undergraduate students, and second, anxiety levels were much lower overall in 
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Experiment 3 as there was not a direct manipulation of anxiety so it would have been difficult to 
use the same cut-off scores as Experiments 1 and 2. 
 In all the experiments, cut-off scores were used to divide participants into high and low 
anxiety groups. There are two commonly used ways of dividing participants into anxiety groups: 
experimenters can use the extreme ends of the scale to represent each group (e.g., the upper and 
lower quartiles) or a single cut-off point (e.g., either a median split or a point derived from 
normative data). However, in this study we wanted to use data from all participants and therefore 
opted to use a single cut-off score for grouping. Because of this participants were included who 
fell only 1 point apart from each other on the STIA or STICSA scale and yet were in different 
groups. There is not a theoretical difference in 1 point on either of those scales. However, as this 
experiment was concerned with healthy undergraduate students without clinical anxiety, there 
was restriction in the range of scores provided because a high enough score would denote 
clinical anxiety. Methods of dividing participants into high versus low-anxious groups in past 
literature have been varied as well, with some experiments using different scales such as the Test 
Anxiety Scale (Dobson & Markham, 2001, Nolan & Markham, 1998) and those who used the 
STAI using median splits (Valentine & Mesout, 2011), or analyzing results using anxiety as a 
continuous variable (Salthouse, 2012). A higher level of standardization in the classification of 
participants in this area of research might help to produce more consistent results in cognitive 
performance in anxious persons.  
In addition, I was unable to establish a difference is arousal levels through SC to confirm 
self-report levels of anxiety. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) noted that it is extremely difficult to 
match physiological arousal with self-reported anxiety. The researchers suggested that part of the 
reason for this may be that even with similar levels of arousal, anxious participants report higher 
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self-perceived arousal than low-anxious individuals. Valentine and Mesout (2011) measured 
arousal using heart rate in a manipulation check during their London Dungeon experiment and 
found that changes in heart rate accounted for fifty-eight percent of the variance in state anxiety. 
However, their experiment had a much higher level of state anxiety reported (average of 49 
overall) and a much longer anxiety induction (~ 45 minutes). In Experiment 1, I was unable to 
show an association between SC and state anxiety, even during my ten-minute anxiety induction. 
Unfortunately, the transient nature of the association between self-reported anxiety and 
physiological arousal can make results less convincing as self-report measures can be flawed. 
 However, even with these limitations, this series of experiments has uncovered some 
interesting new evidence. First, I discovered and then confirmed that when participants are given 
time to evaluate responses through confidence ratings or deciding to change an answer, there is 
not a processing speed deficit in anxious participants for the recognition response. Anxious 
participants are able to make recognition decisions from long-term memory as quickly as their 
low-anxious peers. I also showed that when reviewing responses, either with a confidence 
judgment or a decision to modify an answer, anxious participants had longer response times, 
indicating greater hesitation or worry. This finding does not support processing efficiency theory 
which predicts that processing speed deficits should be present in recognition judgments in 
anxious individuals. The increased hesitation seen in post-memorial evaluation may have 
practical implications. Anxious individuals may require greater amounts of time when 
completing tests as they need more time to reflect on their memory classifications. Despite 
normal processing speed for memory responses, from my evidence it seems likely that on a test 
an anxious person would take longer moving from one question to another because they would 
be evaluating the accuracy of their previous response.  
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Second, I introduced two manipulations in an attempt to alleviate the effect of anxiety on 
both memory accuracy and confidence, both of which were lower in the anxious group in 
Experiment 1. Neither of these manipulations resulted in the anxious group reaching parity with 
the low-anxious except in the case of Experiment 2, where anxious participants were no longer 
significantly different in confidence from the low-anxious group. However, an increase in 
confidence is not helpful to the anxious group without an accompanying increase in memory 
accuracy. The two manipulations had different effects: increased encoding time, while not 
beneficial to a greater amount in the anxious than low-anxious group, did improve memory 
accuracy scores for the anxious group, while the ability to change responses decreased accuracy. 
Therefore, in a practical sense, anxious individuals should be encouraged, with the rest of the 
population, to study information longer if they wish to recognize it with greater accuracy, but 
unlike low-anxious individuals, anxious persons might not want to change their memorial 
responses on examinations.  
Further work is required for the response switching paradigm, though, as I did not test 
anxious individuals using a multiple-choice paradigm. Multiple-choice questions and answer 
switching have been studied more extensively because multiple choice is a common testing 
method in both high school, university, and on standardized tests such as the SAT and GRE. 
 Lastly, I have replicated past findings that anxious participants report lower levels of 
confidence on tests of long-term memory, and I have expanded this finding by examining how 
realistic or predictive of accuracy this level of confidence is in anxious and low-anxious 
participants. Overall, anxious participants had either the same predictive resolution or had lower 
predictive resolution when compared to their low-anxious peers. This relation has not been tested 
extensively in the literature. This finding is important, because given the frequency of 
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overconfidence reported in the literature, it was possible that anxious individuals were reporting 
lower confidence because they were better able to assess their own performance. This view was 
not supported. As such, results indicate that anxious participants are under-confident; this lack of 
confidence could be affecting their everyday functioning. It is possible that anxious persons are 
less likely to speak up in discussions because they doubt their responses, are less likely to be 
selected as witnesses in court (Dobson & Markham, 2001), and are perceived by others as less 
reliable (Nolan & Markam, 1998). For these reasons, I would encourage future research to 
explore ways of alleviating the effects of anxiety on long-term memory to help anxious 
individuals to respond more accurately and to feel more confident in their abilities. 
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